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THE RIGHT TO CONTROL MEDICAL TREATMENT UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
One of the basic policies underlying the law of workmen's com-
pensation is that the employee, injured while in the service of an em-
ployer, is entitled to have his medical care provided at the expense of
that employer.' Most workmen's compensation statutes so provide.'
Early in the law of workmen's compensation, however, a heated con-
troversy arose over who should choose the doctor or hospital to render
the actual treatment. On one side were those who subscribed to the
"free choice" theory, i.e., that the employee should be allowed a free
rein in choosing his own doctor, all costs to be borne by the employer.
Proponents of this theory argued that the confidence which an injured
employee would presumably have in a physician of his own choosing
would help speed recovery, to the benefit of all concerned.3 Opposing
this theory were the "rehabilitationists," who argued that a doctor
chosen by the employer, being more highly motivated to return the in-
jured employee to his job, would utilize the best possible medical treat-
ment in order to minimize the effects of the injury and better control
malingering by the employee.4 They also feared that allowing the em-
ployee to choose his own physician, solely at the expense of the em-
ployer, would encourage unnecessary medical treatment.5
This problem is only today being resolved.6 As is true with most
controversies, the most common solution has been to strike a balance
between the extremes. Only five states, New York,7 Massachusetts, 8
Washington, 9 Wisconsin, 0 and Rhode Island," still adhere to a pure
1. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
2. 2 LARSON § 61.12, at 88.233.
3. See 2 LARSON § 61.12, at 88.235.
4. 10 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 2001, at 13-14 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER].
5. Id. See also Bower, Free Choice of Physicians Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, 25 INS. COUNSEL 1. 333 (1958).
6. See generally 2 LARSON § 61.12, at 88.235-36 (discussion of the suggested
draft of the Compensation and Rehabilitation Law of the Council of State Govern-
ments).
7. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 13-a (McKinney 1965) (employee may
choose doctor approved by the workmen's compensation board).
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 30 (1958).
9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.36.010 (Supp. 1968).
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.42 (1957) (employee may choose from a panel pro-
vided by the employer).
11. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-33-8 (1956).
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free choice theory. In most states, the compromise has taken the form
of giving the employer the initial choice of physician, but allowing the
employee under certain circumstances to procure his own treatment
either initially or at a later date.1"
The California statute 3 is typical. It allows the employer to
specify the physician in the first instance, giving the employee the right
of reimbursement for self-procured care in cases where the employer
refuses or neglects to provide adequate treatment. Although the orig-
inal California workmen's compensation law was otherwise,' 4 there is
today in California no statutory time limit upon the employer's liability
for medical care.' 5 Nor does California put a financial limit on the
employer's liability for such care.'" In the event the employee is dis-
satisfied with the care provided by the employer's first doctor, he may
request a change and choose another physician from a panel tendered
by the employer.'
7
Whether the employee will be reimbursed for his self-procured
care will often depend upon whether adequate notice of the need for
medical treatment has been given the employer. In order to protect
the employer's right to control medical care, the courts will usually deny
reimbursement for self-procured care that is undertaken without ade-
quate notice having been given.'" The point at which notice need no
longer be given usually coincides with the point at which control of
medical treatment is held to have passed from the employer to the em-
ployee.' 9 The exact point at which this control is transferred (notice
12. 10 SCHNEIDER § 2001, at 8-10.
13. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600, which provides in part:
Medical, surgical, and hospital treatment ... which is reasonably required to
cure or relieve from the effects of the injury shall be provided by the employer.
In the case of his neglect or refusal seasonably to do so, the employer is liable
for the reasonable expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee in pro-
viding treatment.
14. Cal. Stats. 1911, ch. 399, § 8(1), at 798.
15. See note 57 infra. Many jurisdictions have such time limits. E.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 14 (Supp. 1968) (sixty-day time limit on liability, with extension
at the discretion of the board).
16. See note 57 infra. Many other jurisdictions also have financial limits on
employer liability. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114.501 (Supp. 1968).
17. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4601.
18. Leadbettor v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 179 Cal. 468, 177 P. 449 (1918);
Boyles v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 244 Cal. App. 2d 821, 53 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1966)
(employer's physician made return appointment with employee, who then sought pri-
vate care without notice or expression of dissatisfaction with employer's care); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 220 Cal. App. 2d 327, 33 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1963) (employer tendered panel for change of physician upon employee's request;
employee did not respond but sought private care); Sun Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n, 85 Cal. App. 2d 171, 192 P.2d 765 (1948).
19. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 220 Cal. App. 2d 327,
33 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1963).
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thereby becoming unnecessary), as well as the right of the employer
to regain it once it has been transferred, has been greatly clarified by
two recent California Supreme Court decisions.
Recent Decisions
McCoy v. Industrial Accident Commission,20 involved an employee
who suffered an industrial back injury and was given unsuccessful
physiotherapy by the carrier's doctors. Approximately six months after
the accident, she filed a petition with the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion to determine the liability of the carrier for further medical treat-
ment. The carrier's doctors, as well as an independent physician ap-
pointed by the commission, were of the opinion that no further treat-
ment was necessary, and the commission so found. During the next
three months, however, the employee continued to complain of pain and
was again examined by the carrier's physicians. They were still of the
opinion that no further treatment was indicated, and this time the car-
rier formally declined to provide any further care. Another hearing
was held, but no evidence was taken, the parties requesting more time
for medical investigation. Immediately thereafter, the employee's coun-
sel wrote to the carrier, requesting certain medical records and indi-
cating that she was soon to be seen by a private specialist. The specialist
diagnosed her condition as a ruptured disc and confined her to the
hospital for further tests. While these tests were being conducted, the
employee was ordered by the carrier to report to its doctor for further
examination. She failed to respond to this order and instead under-
went a successful laminectomy and fusion at the hands of her self-
procured specialist. The commission denied reimbursement, holding
that the employee had not given the carrier the requisite notice of
need for surgery.
21
Several previous appellate cases22 had been decided on the theory
that notice of need for further medical treatment should be excused
only when the demand for care would be a futile one. On review
before the supreme court, the commission contended that, had a demand
for needed surgery been made, the carrier could have provided it, and
notice therefore would not have been futile. The court, in reversing
the order of the commission, held that even though the carrier might
have been able to provide the needed surgery upon demand, employer
control over medical treatment had been terminated at the time of the
employer's refusal to extend further care, and thus the employee was
20. 64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1966).
21. McCoy v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Comp. Cases 272 (1965).
22. See e.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d
656, 10 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1961); Calif. Union Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 183
Cal. App. 2d 644, 7 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1960).
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under no further duty to look to the carrier for her treatment. 2 In
other words, the court held that the employer's right to control treat-
ment is surrendered when he is given the opportunity to provide med-
ical service, and refuses.2 4 Since he no longer has the right to control
treatment, neither does he have the right to be notified of the employ-
ee's intention to seek his own care. The court added, however, that
in order for the employee to retain control, his condition must remain
substantially the same as it was at the time of refusal, and that his pri-
vate care must begin within a reasonable time following refusal.25
If these conditions are not fulfilled, presumably the employer will get a
"fresh" right and may regain control through an adequate tender of
treatment.
In Zeeb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,20 the supreme
court turned its attention to this right of the employer to regain control.
An employer, in good faith, had refused treatment to an employee who
had contracted industrial dermatitis, so the employee sought self-pro-
cured medical treatment, for which he was reimbursed pursuant to the
later order of the Industrial Accident Commission. Following this or-
der, the employer tendered the services of its physician, but the employee
refused and sought an order from the commission allowing him to
continue treatment by his self-procured doctor at the employer's ex-
pense. The commission denied this request.2 7 On review, the supreme
court reversed the commission and allowed reimbursement for the con-
tinuing private care. In so doing, it cited with approval the language of
the McCoy case to the effect that upon refusal the employer immediately
relinquishes his right of control to the employee. 8 However, the court
also placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the doctor-patient
relationship is a significant factor in affecting a cure, and for this rea-
son should not be disturbed by a change of physicians.29
23. 64 Cal. 2d at 89, 410 P.2d at 366, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
24. Id. The following conduct on the part of the employer has been held to
constitute refusal: declining to offer treatment in good faith reliance on medical
opinion that injury is nonindustrial, Kammerer v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 259
Cal. App. 2d 518, 66 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968); referring the employee to an insurafice
carrier that denies liability, Felder v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp.
Cases 338 (1969); terminating treatment based on good faith misdiagnosis of the con-
dition, Rodarte v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 30 Cal. Comp. Cases 152 (1964). A
later case, Brotherton v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 273 A.C.A. 485, 78 Cal. Rptr.
70 (1969) has held the language of McCoy applicable to the situation where the em-
ployer merely fails, rather than refuses, to provide treatment.
25. 64 Cal. 2d at 89, 410 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
26. 67 Cal. 2d 496, 432 P.2d 361, 62 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1967).
27. Zeeb v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 32 Cal. Comp. Cases 206 (1967).
28. 67 Cal. 2d at 502, 432 P.2d at 364, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
29. Id. at 502, 432 P.2d at 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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Read together, the holdings of Zeeb and McCoy30 would appear
to state a general rule that once the employer has refused to provide
treatment and the employee reasonably soon thereafter makes arrange-
ments for private care, the employer loses control of the case. Having
relinquished control to the employee, he will then be held liable for all
medical services reasonably procured by the employee. If private treat-
ment is already in progress, this rule seems desirable and justified in
view of the beneficial aspects of a continued doctor-patient relationship.
Where the employee has not yet commenced private care,31 however,
the rule may in some cases produce a harsh result. An employer, af-
ter a good faith refusal, may reconsider and make a tender of adequate
care the next day. If the language of McCoy is read strictly, the em-
ployee in this situation could refuse with impunity the tender of the
employer even though he has not yet embarked on a course of treat-
ment by his own physician in reliance on the employer's refusal, be-
cause the employer, by refusing to treat, has relinquished for all
time his right to control treatment.
32
A more equitable approach is suggested by the reasoning behind
the Zeeb holding. Where the employee has already undertaken, or
made substantial arrangements for private care, he should be allowed
to follow through with it.33  If he has made no such commitment to
private care, however, he should not be allowed to take advantage of a
good faith mistake of the employer in refusing treatment, and should
be required to accept an adequate tender if made. This would insure
both that the employee would be allowed to retain his beneficial private
treatment and that the employer would not be unjustly penalized for a
mistaken refusal.
The Successful Treatment Rule
Once the employer has been guilty of either refusal or neglect, the
employee, under most statutes, is entitled to seek his own medical care,
at the expense of the employer.34 In order to protect the employer and
to promote expeditious treatment, most states require that self-procured
medical treatment, to be reimbursable, must be reasonably necessary to
30. 64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1966); see text accompany-
ing notes 18-23 supra.
31. In both McCoy and Zeeb, the employee had already undergone private care
before the action was brought.
32. In this situation, according to McCoy, the employer would have immediately
lost the right to control the employee's medical care when he refused to provide
service, regardless of reliance by the employee. See text accompanying notes 21-23
supra.
33. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
34. 10 SCHNEIDER § 2001, at 8-10.
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alleviate effects of the industrial injury.35 This is apparent from an
analysis of the statutes and decisions of other jurisdictions.
Self-Procured Medical Treatment in Other States
The New Jersey statute 6 provides for an initial choice of doctor
by the employer, but affords the employee to the right to procure treat-
ment on his own in cases where the employer neglects or refuses to do
so. Like the California statute,37 it also provides for unlimited medical
treatment, subject only to the requirement that the injured employee file
a petition for all necessary services in excess of $50. As is also true
in California,3" it reimburses only such self-procured medical treatment
as is necessary.
39
In Ducasse v. Walworth Manufacturing Co.,40 the New Jersey
court was faced with construing this statute. The employee had suf-
fered a back injury in the course of his employment. After unsuccess-
ful treatment by several doctors, he underwent a laminectomy by a pri-
vate physician, which not only proved fruitless, but actually increased
his disability. The court, in granting an award which included com-
pensation for the increased disability, observed that the employee, hav-
ing been in constant pain and discomfort, acted in a reasonable and
justifiable manner in seeking the ill-fated surgery, and noted further
that "[t]he fact that the operation was unsuccessful and resulted in in-
creased disability does not, under the law, deprive a conscientious and
deserving employee from the benefits of the statute.'"41  Although the
court in this case did not expressly pass on the issue of reimbursement for
the costs of the unsuccessful operation, the reasoning behind its holding
would seem to apply equally to the award of such expenses.
Such a result was subsequently reached in Monaco v. Albert
Maund, Inc.,42 where the employee suffered a brain concussion and
spinal injuries, which caused the employer's doctors to later discharge
him from their care as beyond cure. He procured a private surgeon
and underwent an operation which improved his condition only very
35. 10 SCHNEIDER § 2005, at 43.
36. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (1959).
37. CAM. LABOR CODE § 4600; see note 12 supra.
38. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600; see note 12 supra.
39. The New Jersey statute would seem to be more strict than that of California,
since it provides for reimbursement only for self-procured treatment "necessary" to
cure the injury; section 4600 of the Labor Code allows for reimbursement of private
care such as is "reasonably required" to cure. However, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has construed "necessary" to mean "reasonably necessary." See text accompany-
ing note 41 infra.
40. 1 N.J. Super. 77, 62 A.2d 480 (App. Div. 1948).
41. Id. at 83, 62 A.2d at 482.
42. 17 N.J. Super. 425, 86 A.2d 279 (App. Div. 1952).
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slightly. In granting reimbursement for the unsuccessful treatment, the
court said: "If the treatment obtained by appellant seemed reasonably
necessary and if the charges were fair, the respondent is liable.
'43
From these cases, it can be seen that New Jersey subscribes to the
view that if the self-procured medical treatment seems reasonable, the
employer should be liable for the expenses incurred therein, regardless
of the success or failure of the actual procedure.
Tennessee also has a statute44 similar to that of California, except
that it gives the employer the right to specify a panel of three or more
physicians from which the employee chooses one to render his initial
medical treatment. It provides further that the employer shall be liable
for medical expenses only to a maximum amount of $1,800. It has
provisions analogous to those of the California statute whereby the
employee may be reimbursed for self-procured medical expenses .4  Un-
like the California statute, however, it places a $100 limit on the lia-
bility of the employer for self-procured care.
46
The leading case construing this statute, Atlas Powder Co. v.
Grant,47 concerned an employee who suffered a back injury. He was
treated without success for three or four months by the employer's doc-
tors, who refused to perform an operation. He eventually sought his
own physician, under whose direction he underwent a laminectomy that
proved to be unsuccessful. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that
the treatment having been reasonable though unsuccessful, reimburse-
ment was proper.4
The California Rule
The California provision, 49 while requiring the employer to procure
such medical treatment as is "reasonably required to cure or relieve
from the effects of the injury," 50 provides further that should he refuse
43. Id. at 433, 86 A.2d at 282.
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (Supp. 1968).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (Supp. 1968) provides that the employee
may procure his own medical care in the case of an "emergency, or on account of the
employer's failure or refusal to provide the medical care and services required by this
law . . . . "
46. Id. This $100 limit on self-procured treatment has now been all but abrogated
by the case of Atlas Powder Co. v. Grimes, 200 Tenn. 206, 292 S.W.2d 13 (1956),
wherein the court allowed reimbursement for self-procured medical expenses of over
$1000. In so doing, the court noted the rather perceptive statement of counsel that if
the limit were allowed to stand, employers would always be able to limit their medical
liability for injured employees by simply refusing to render any treatment. Id. at 218,
292 S.W.2d at 18.
47. 200 Tenn. 617, 293 S.W.2d 180 (1956).
48. 24 TENN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1957).
49. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600.
50. Id.
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or neglect seasonably to do so, "the employer is liable for the reason-
able expense incurred by or on behalf of the employee, in providing
treatment."5 1 This is a provision common to most workmen's compen-
sation statutes.52 California courts, however, have qualified this pro-
vision by requiring that self-procured medical treatment, to be reimburs-
able, must be successful either in affecting a cure, or at least in providing
substantial improvement.
The rule appears to have its origins in the early workmen's compen-
sation case of Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Commission.
5 3
In that case the employee, a sixteen-year old boy, fell from a ladder in
the course of his employment, breaking an arm and both legs. He was
provided medical treatment at the private hospital of the employer,
then was released to return on an outpatient basis. His injuries proved
to be quite serious; he was on crutches for a considerable period of
time, and there was a continuous discharge of fluid from one leg due to
necrosis of the improperly healed bone. This condition persisted for
almost four years, despite treatment by the employer's doctors. At the
end of this period, the employee finally lost confidence and sought a
physician of his own. His doctor recommended immediate surgery.
The employer's physicians were of the opinion that further conservative
treatment was indicated, and refused to perform the surgery. After
waiting nine months, during which time the condition grew progressively
worse, the employee's private physician performed two operations upon
the injured leg. The result was a complete and dramatic recovery; the
leg healed completely, and the injured employee was able to walk
without crutches and returned to work for the first time in four years.
The Industrial Accident Commission awarded the employee the costs
of his self-procured medical care,54 and the employer was granted
certiorari to the supreme court. The supreme court, deciding the case
under section 15(a) of the 1915 act,55 affirmed the award. In so
doing, it held that under the statute the employer is required to furnish
such medical care as will reasonably tend to cure the employee. When
the employer's physicians failed to cure the employee, such care was not
being provided; when they declined to perform the operation, such care
was refused, thereby justifying the resort to self-procured medical care.
The success of the operation demonstrated the reasonableness of the
treatment. Justice Lennon, writing for the court, was then prompted to
state:
Before the injured employee would be entitled to compensation
51. Id.
52. 2 LARSON § 61.12, at 88.238; 10 ScmirmEa § 2005, at 43.
53. 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410 (1922).
54. Henneberry v. Union Iron Works Co., 8 I.A.C. 98 (1921).
55. Cal. Stats. 1915, ch. 607, § 4 at 1082.
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for expenses incurred in the treatment of him by a physician of his
own selection it would have to be shown that the treatment not
only was a success but that it was reasonably and seasonably neces-
sary to cure and relieve the injured employee. Moreover, all the
circumstances attending the treatment by the employer's physician
would have to be weighed by the commission in order to determine
whether or not the treatment prescribed by the employer's physi-
cians would, if it had been persisted in, have produced as speedy
and as satisfactory a cure as did the treatment of the physicians
resorted to by the injured employee. . . . In other words, the
injured employee will be permitted, at the peril of medical treat-
ment, to secure the services of physicians other than those pro-
vided by his employer, and this peril will attach unless it can be
shown from all of the circumstances of the situation, including the
success of the operation, that his desire and decision to secure the
services of other physicians was warranted. 56
The announcement of the rule was not necessary to the decision of
the case. Indeed, the circumstances of the case seem so strong from the
employee's standpoint that one would have expected a liberal rule con-
cerning reimbursement. Rather, the rule appears to have been the
product of judicial overcaution, as the following language may suggest:
It is insisted by the petitioners that the award cannot be allowed
to stand without giving to the injured employee not only the abso-
lute right to refuse such medical services as may be tendered and
furnished to him by his employers, but the right as well to seek
and secure the services of other physicians and surgeons at the ex-
pense of the employer if, perchance, a physician or surgeon can
be found who will prescribe and advise a treatment different from
that prescribed by the physicians furnished by the employer. In
other words, it is contended that an employer will be required to
pay any and all doctor bills which an employee might at his whim
incur.
57
The court appears to have overreacted to the loudly voiced fears
of industry that the employer would be forced to pay for all medical
treatment the employee might have occasion to require, whether or not
it was reasonably related to the cure of industrial injury. The sensitive
reaction of the court in this case is perhaps also a product of the times
in which it was decided. It had been less than 10 years since the pas-
sage of California's first compulsory workmen's compensation act,58 and
56. 190 Cal. at 41, 210 P. at 414.
57. Id. at 40, 210 P. at 414.
58. The Roseberry Act, Cal. Stats. 1911, ch. 399, at 796, California's first
workmen's compensation legislation, which was noncompulsory, contained provisions
for employer control and self-procured medical treatment essentially the same as those
of the present statute, but with a $100 and 90 day limit on employer liability. The
Workmen's Compensation and Safety Act, Cal Stats. 1913, ch. 176, § 15, at 284-87,
the first compulsory workmen's compensation act, eliminated the $100 maximum, and
the Compensation Act of 1917, Cal. Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 9(b)(5), at 838, dropped
the 90 day limit. The language of the control provision has remained substantially
the same since the Roseberry Act.
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industry was still understandably apprehensive about the inroads the
new law would make into employer control over employees. What-
ever the motivating forces behind the rule, it soon became the accepted
standard, both before the Industrial Accident Commission 9 and the
courts.60
In 1944, however, two commission cases were decided that brought
into question the status of the rule. The first, Bawart v. Neal Stratford
& Kerr,61 concerned an employee who contracted dermatitis from
printing solutions with which he was required to work. The employer's
doctor, who was of the opinion that the disease was nonindustrial in
origin, took the employee as a private patient, but was unable to cure
him. A second physician consulted by the employee also treated him
without success. A third correctly diagnosed the disease as industrial
and was successful in curing him. Although two of the doctors pri-
vately consulted by the employee rendered treatment that was admittedly
unsuccessful, the Industrial Accident Commission ruled that the em-
ployee was entitled to reimbursement for the services of all three of the
physicians.6 2  The commission found that the employer, having ne-
glected his duty, was liable for the reasonable services of the doctors,
"notwithstanding that the treatment was not beneficial as there was no
showing, in view of the mistaken diagnosis, that the treatment was not
proper under the circumstances since all treatments were intended to
relieve and cure the applicant of his dermatitis. '6 3  Such a decision
would seem to deny the existence of the successful treatment rule. Yet
another commission case,64 decided six days later by a different referee,
awarded reimbursement after specifically noting the favorable outcome
of the self-procured treatment. The commission cited as authority three
cases that had established success as a criterion for reimbursement. 65
Five more recent cases have left the law in this area in an even greater
state of confusion.
59. See, e.g., Johnson v. Crowley Launch & Tug Co., 18 I.A.C. 18 (1932)
(allowing reimbursement for a successful operation, but denying claim for previous
ineffective treatments); Fornero v. Kennedy Mine & Milling Co., 12 I.A.C. 100
(1925).
60. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 202 Cal. 437,
261 P. 295 (1927), which held that the commission has jurisdiction to order employer
to pay employee's self-procured medical expenses, provided treatment is successful;
County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 69, 56 P.2d 577
(1936).
61. 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 76 (1944).
62. Id. at 77.
63. Id.
64. Miller v. Union Furniture Co., 10 Cal. Comp. Cases 77 (1944).
65. Union Iron Works v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410
(1922); County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 69, 56
P.2d 577 (1936); Johnson v. Crowley Launch & Tug Co., 18 I.C. 18 (1932).
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In the first of these, 60 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, the employee was injured on the job, and was treated by
the carrier's physicians. After a time, she became dissatisfied with this
treatment. Pursuant to the provisions of the California Labor Code,"'
the employer tendered a panel of three physicians for her choice. The
employee did not respond to this offer, but rather sought self-procured
medical treatment, which proved to be ineffectual. The Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarded the employee further temporary disability
and reimbursement for these expenses. The carrier petitioned for,
and was granted, a writ of review. In its attempt to show before the
court that resort to self-procured medical treatment was justified, the
commission relied heavily on four cases that allowed reimbursement for
self-procured treatment.68  The court discussed each of these cases at
some length, and explicitly observed that in each one the self-procured
treatment had been successful.69 It noted further that
[o]ne of the tests announced in those cases, to establish [the em-
ployer's liability for his employee's] self-procured medical treatment,
is that the treatment received from the applicant's own physi-
cians was a success, and that it was reasonably and seasonably
necessary. In this connection, there is a total lack of such showing.
In fact, the commission concedes that the applicant has not been
successfully relieved from her complaints.
7 0
Relying on the unsuccessful outcome of the self-procured treatment7
and the employee's unjustified refusal of the carrier's tender of care, the
court reversed the award as to reimbursement.
The Pacific Indemnity case was heavily relied upon two years later
by the petitioner in Foremost Dairies v. Industrial Accident Com-
66. 220 Cal. App. 2d 327, 33 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1963).
67. Cal. Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 4601, at 281.
68. Union Iron Works v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410
(1922); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 656, 10
Cal. Rptr. 566 (1961); California Union Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 183 Cal.
App. 2d 644, 7 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1960) (successful operation by employee's physician
following misdiagnosis and refusal of further treatment by carrier's doctors); County of
Los Angeles v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 69, 56 P.2d 577 (1936).
In Industrial Indemnity Co., the carrier's physicians, failing to properly diagnose the
employee's back ailment, refused to render further treatment; the employee's own doctor
thereafter correctly diagnosed and successfully removed a ruptured disc. 188 Cal.
App. 2d at 658, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
69. 220 Cal. App. 2d at 331-33, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53.
70. Id. at 333, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
71. It is interesting to note that the court took it upon itself to invoke the
successful treatment rule. In discussing the cases cited by the commission, the carrier
distinguished them only on the grounds that they all involved actual neglect or refusal
on the part of the employer, and made no mention of the fact that they all involved, or
expressly required, successful treatment. Petitioner's Reply to Points and Authorities
at 15, Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 220 Cal. App. 2d 327, 33
Cal. Rptr. 649 (1963).
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mission.72 There, the employee, a milkman, suffered an injury to his
leg caused by bumping into his milk truck. He later developed res-
piratory and other chest problems and sought the treatment of his family
doctor, thinking his symptoms were not industrially caused. He was
referred to several other private doctors, who treated him under a num-
ber of misdiagnoses. Three months after the initial accident his con-
dition worsened and he was admitted under private care to a hospital,
where he died five days later. An autopsy revealed extensive emboliza-
tion and infarction of the lungs, which the attending physician attributed
to the industrial accident.
The Industrial Accident Commission awarded reimbursement for
the unsuccessful private care rendered the decedent. The employer, on
writ of review, contended, among other things, that the self-procured
treatment not having been shown to be successful, the award of reim-
bursement was improper. It cited the Pacific Indemnity case and
quoted its language as sole authority for this proposition.73 Although
many other issues were presented and discussed, the court of appeal
was rather explicit in its treatment of the employer's contention:
The test of when an employer may be held liable for self-procured
medical help cannot be frozen into one interpretation of a single
sentence contained in the opinion in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission. . . . To read that sentence into
a mechanistic formula that liability can never attach to an employer
unless the medical assistance procured by the employee is successful
is to say that an employer may wrongfully deny medical treatment
to an injured employee, thus shifting to the employee the burden
of bearing his own medical expenses without hope of reimbursement
from the employer, unless the self-procured treatment is deemed
to be successful. Such a situation would be intolerable and contrary
to the compensation act.
74
Since this decision turned almost entirely on issues of causation and in-
volved a rather unusual factual situation,7 5 it should not be interpreted
as a complete rejection of the successful treatment rule. 76 The language
of the court, however, would seem to be equally persuasive in all cases
involving unsuccessful treatment.
In the 1966 California Supreme Court case of McCoy v. Industrial
72. 237 Cal. App. 2d 560, 47 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965).
73. Petition for Writ of Review at 49, 50, Reply to Answer to Petition for
Writ of Review at 25, Foremost Dairies Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 237 Cal. App.
2d 560, 47 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965).
74. 237 Cal. App. 2d at 577, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (citation omitted).
75. The court specifically distinguished Pacific Indemnity on the grounds that
there the employer had provided medical care, while in the Foremost case the em-
ployee himself did not know the industrial nature of his injury and thus was given no
care whatsoever by the employer. Id. at 575, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
76. But see 2 W. HANNA, CArOarNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORK-
MEN'S COMPENsATION § 16.05(4)(d), at 16-51 & n.123 (1968).
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Accident Commission,77 the court was concerned primarily with the
question of what conduct of the employer would justify the employee in
seeking his own medical treatment. 78  However, its discussion of
whether, after neglect by the employer, an employee should be required
to give additional notice of need for medical treatment as a condition
precedent to reimbursable self-procured treatment is relevant to the
continued viability of the successful treatment rule. The court noted:
An employee who claims to be in need of further medical care
would be placed at a serious disadvantage if he were compelled,
as a condition of reimbursement, to renew his demand for treat-
ment after the employer's initial refusal. While it is true that the
employer may then comply with his request, the dilatory process of
an additional request and submission to further examination by the
employer's doctors could result in delaying necessary medical care.
In some cases, such as the present one, it might be impossible to
establish until after surgery is completed that it was reasonably
required, and the employee would then be required to obtain the
treatment from his own doctor, apprehensively hoping that his
claim for reimbursement could be proved by a successful re-
sult. . . . There is no reason to believe the Legislature intended
section 4600 to be interpreted in a manner to impose such a burden
on an injured employee. 79
Although this language of the court is by no means clear, it appears
to have affirmed the rule by implication. What the court seems to
be saying is that, if notice were to be required, an employee, whose
injury was not amenable to diagnosis without surgery, would be forced
to make a demand upon the employer for treatment. The employer's
physician, unable to properly diagnose the nature or extent of the in-
jury without surgery, would refuse. The employee would then, after
this needless delay, be obliged to seek his own treatment, for which he
would be held personally liable if such treatment proved unsuccessful80
What the court fails to note is that under the successful treatment rule,
the employee will be faced with the dilemma of being held liable for
77. 64 Cal. 2d 82, 410 P.2d 362, 48 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1966).
78. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra for a discussion of this phase of the
case.
79. 64 Cal. 2d at 89, 410 P.2d at 367, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
80. But see 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION, § 16.05(4)(d) (1968), where McCoy is cited for the propo-
sition that successful treatment is not required. The case, however, was not concerned
with the successful treatment rule, but with notice and employer control. The treat-
ment was admittedly successful, and neither side raised any issue concerning it. It
seems highly unlikely that the court would choose such a situation to challenge a rule
so totally unrelated to the case. In addition, had the court wished to refute the rule,
it presumably would have cited the Foremost case, which had done so in more limited
circumstances less than a year before. Although Foremost is cited in support of other
holdings in the McCoy decision, it is nowhere mentioned in connection with the
successful treatment rule. 64 Cal. 2d at 91, 410 P.2d at 368, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
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unsuccessful treatment anytime he undertakes self-procured care, re-
gardless of whether notice has been given to the employer.
Two later Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board cases have
further muddied the water. Wilson v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board8' concerned an employee who, after sustaining an indus-
trial neck injury, was treated by the employer's physicians for a period
of about four years. Unable to gain relief from the employer's treat-
ment, she subsequently underwent self-procured surgery, which pro-
duced some, but not substantial improvement. The referee, in denying
reimbursement, noted that "'[ilnasmuch as there has been some im-
provement noted but no substantial improvement, it does not appear
that the surgery by Dr. McIvor actually was required by reason of the
injury herein. . . . The expense of self-procured medical treatment
. . .will be denied .. . ."82 In seeking a writ of review, the em-
ployee contended that a specified quantitative level of success is not
a prerequisite to reimbursement for self-procured treatment. The court
of appeal, however, noting with approval the language of the referee,
denied the writ. Hearing was also denied by the supreme court. This
would seem to imply that at least substantial improvement is required.
However, California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board,8 3 a case decided a year later, seemed to go
to the other extreme. There, medical care was furnished by the em-
ployer to an employee with a back injury; the employer later terminated
this treatment and refused to provide further services. The employee,
uncured by the treatment of the employer's doctors, sought his own
physician. After failing to cure the employee with one course of treat-
ment, the self-procured doctor performed a diagnostic spinal injection
which produced convulsions and death the same day. The carrier
produced medical witnesses who testified that this procedure amounted
to malpractice. The board awarded both death benefits and reimburse-
ment for the grossly unsuccessful self-procured medical treatment.8 4
Irrationality of the California Rule
The confused state in which these cases leave the law on reim-
bursability of self-procured medical treatment is greatly in need of
judicial clarification. The employee, at present, cannot know until his
claim is finally adjudicated, whether the successful treatment rule will
apply. Furthermore, the rule itself is undesirable. The employee, for
all practical purposes, is forced to gamble with his health. When the
81. 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 328 (1968).
82. id. at 329.
83. 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 146 (1969).
84. Id.
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employer's doctors have failed to cure him, he has two choices: He
may either continue to suffer with the employer's ineffectual treatment,
or he may elect to seek his own care. If he chooses the latter course, he
does so entirely at his own risk. Should the treatment fail, reasonable
though it may be, he will be personally liable.
The California legislature has already recognized and dealt with
a similar problem presented by another aspect of section 4600 of the
Labor Code. This section deals not only with medical expenses in-
curred to cure the effects of injury, but also with those incurred inci-
dent to litigation over the injury. The second paragraph of the statute
covers medical expenses that are incurred in the effort to prove a claim.
These expenses normally involve medical examination and testimony,
which are needed as evidence in the applicant's effort to prove his claim.
Prior to 1959, it was provided that reimbursement for such expenses
could be made only to successful claimants."' In 1959, the legislature,
realizing the inherent unfairness of a provision that forced the employee
to gamble medical expenses on the outcome of his case, amended the
statute to eliminate the requirement of success as a condition precedent
to reimbursement.86 The provision as it now stands requires only that
the expenses be reasonably and necessarily incurred in the effort to
prove the claim. 87  The California Supreme Court,8 in discussing this
amendment, said:
The [petitioner] also argues that allowing such awards to be made
to unsuccessful claimants might result in the filing of frivolous
claims since an employee, regardless of the merit of his claim,
would be entitled to receive a free medical examination. How-
ever, the requirement in section 4600 that the expenses be "rea-
sonably" and "necessarily" incurred is a safeguard against such
abuse.
We are of the view that the statute provides that a claimant,
whether successful or not, is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred for the specified medical serv-
ices. This construction is in accord with the policy . . . that
workmen's compensation laws be liberally construed in favor of
extending their benefits.89
This language would seem to be equally applicable to the rule requiring
success in self-procured treatment. If it is unfair to condition reimburse-
ment of necessary medico-legal expenses on the success of the appli-
cant's claim, 90 it is certainly more unjust to condition the reimbursement
85. Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 751, § 1, at 1373.
86. Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 1189, § 9, at 3278.
87. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4601.
88. Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 842, 382
P.2d 597, 31 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1963).
89. Id. at 844, 382 P.2d at 598, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
90. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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of necessary medical treatment upon the success of that treatment. In
the former case, the expenses are incurred in an effort to secure a dis-
ability award against the employer, while in the latter case the expense
is incurred to restore the employee's health. Thus, the successful treat-
ment rule would seem to contravene the policies behind the law of work-
men's compensation.
The rule requiring successful treatment also puts the employer in a
particularly advantageous position. When faced with a demand by an
injured employee for medical treatment for which he is legally respon-
sible,01 he may simply refuse, or at best undertake half-hearted treat-
ment, thereby forcing the employee to seek his own care. If the self-
procured treatment is unsuccessful, the employer is not required to
pay; 2 if it is successful and he is forced to reimburse the employee,
he is out nothing, as he would presumably have been required to pro-
vide such care at the hands of his own physicians anyway. 3
The private physician whom the injured employee has chosen is
also placed in somewhat of a dilemma, in that if his treatment of the
employee fails, he will have only the personal liability of his patient to
which he may look for payment for his services. This factor would
seem to discourage the self-procured physician from undertaking any
liberal treatment, and very possibly might prevent him from taking the
employee's case at all.
A more satisfactory approach would seem to be that adopted by
New Jersey and Tennessee, discussed above,94 and that suggested by the
Foremost case.95 Under this view, the injured employee would be reim-
bursed for justifiably procured private treatment, provided only that it
was reasonable. The reasonableness of the treatment procured would
be a factual question to be resolved in the individual case. The em-
ployee should be required to use ordinary diligence in the selection of a
private physician, taking into account the seriousness of his injury and
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the treatment given him by the
employer. In many situations, competent doctors may differ in their
views on what treatment is necessary; therefore, the fact that the care
rendered is not that which a majority of doctors would prescribe should
91. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 4600.
92. See, e.g., Union Iron Works v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 210
P. 410 (1922). This will probably be true even if the unsuccessful treatment is
reasonable. Thus, by denying reimbursement for unsuccessful treatment, the rule
permits the employer to escape liability for reasonable medical care, contrary to section
4600 of the Labor Code.
93. In this way, the employer also avoids the burden of undertaking an unsuccess-
ful operation by his own doctors, at his expense.
94. See text accompanying notes 34-47 supra.
95. 237 Cal. App. 2d 560, 47 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965); see text accompanying
notes 74-76 supra.
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not be determinative. Rather, the only requirement should be that it
was such treatment as a competent doctor, after taking into account
all the circumstances of the case, could reasonably prescribe. Success
or failure might here be brought in as evidence of reasonableness or lack
thereof, but should not be the sole determinative factor.96
A problem might be presented by private treatment that not
only is unsuccessful, but actually worsens the condition of the employee.
Providing that the procedure undertaken was a reasonable one, reim-
bursement should be allowed."7 In addition, other jurisdictions in this
situation have held the employer liable for the increased disability
caused by the unsuccessful treatment of the employee's physician.9"
This result seems justified. It is, after all, the employer who has
through his neglect or refusal forced the employee to seek the unsuccess-
ful treatment. Holding the employer liable for unsuccessful or harmful
treatment that is reasonably procured by the employee would encourage
more diligent treatment on the part of the employer.
In short, an "ordinary, reasonable man" approach would be a far
more satisfactory solution to the problem of self-procured medical care
than the "successful treatment" rule now in force. It would allow the
employee who had either been provided inadequate care by the em-
ployer or refused any care whatsoever, to undertake, in good faith,
reasonable procedures for the cure of his injury. It would likewise re-
quire the employer, who is responsible for the care, to protect himself
by upgrading his standards of treatment, so that an employee would
not have to seek his cure elsewhere.
Peter E. Sibley*
96. This is the position taken by Hanna, but he is unfortunately not supported
by the cases. See note 80, supra.
97. A recent board decision awarded reimbursement under such circumstances,
See California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
146 (1969); see text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
98. See, e.g., Johnson Drug Co. v. Thaxton, 121 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1960); Lazzio
v. Primo Silk Co., 114 N.J.L. 450, 117 A. 251 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Janvari v. Peter
Schweitzer Co., 13 N.J. Super. 286, 80 A.2d 367 (Union County Ct. 1951), aff'd, 21
N.J. Super. 248, 91 A.2d 113 (App. Div. 1952).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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